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Regulating “Too Big to Fail”
Summary
The Dodd-Frank Act does not provide sufficient protection against another major financial crisis. A better
regulatory system would promote financial stability by correcting the key market failures that lead to excessive
risk taking by Strategically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). Regulatory policies centered on
contingent capital would offer a clearer and purer market signal when a SIFI is performing poorly and trigger
steps to mitigate the financial risks.
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In December 2012, the firm agreed to a 
record $1.9 billion fine but escaped criminal 
prosecution from U.S. Attorney General 
Eric Holder. In withholding criminal 
charges, prosecutors, in part, cited fear of 
“collateral consequences” of disrupting an 
international bank that is tightly tied to 
almost seven dozen economies throughout 
the world where HSBC operates. In sharp 
response, Oregon Senator Merkley claimed 
that the Justice Department “firmly set the 
precedent that no bank, bank employee, or 
bank executive can be prosecuted even for 
serious criminal actions if that bank is a 
large, systemically important institution.”2 
Indeed, HSBC’s record fine was equal to 
only about one month of earnings.
Despite the passage of the 2010 Dodd-
Frank Act, U.S. regulators remain petrified 
of Systemically Important Financial Institu-
tions (SIFIs). These are entities that are 
widely viewed as “too big to fail” because of 
their possible contagion effects on the rest of 
the financial markets.3 Hundreds of billions 
of taxpayers’ dollars have been spent bailing 
out many of these SIFIs. And, while taxpay-
ers might largely get paid back for their help 
in some of these cases, they will be under-
paid for the risk they have borne. 
The federal government added to the 
disorder by establishing its own track record 
of supporting big bailouts. The counter-
parties of AIG were made whole for their 
losses—100 cents on the dollar—despite 
being sophisticated institutions that are 
better positioned to underwrite their own 
counterparty risks, unlike the disinterested 
taxpayers who ultimately bore those risks. 
Bondholders for Fannie Mae and Fred-
die Mac were also made whole with at 
least $291 billion of taxpayers’ money.4 The 
obligations for just these two entities totaled 
more than $5 trillion, equal to half of all 
publicly-held debt when the federal govern-
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ment agreed to inherit their liabilities in the 
fall of 2008. 
The Dodd-Frank Act tries to address 
some of these issues by forming a founda-
tion that empowers the nation’s key financial 
regulators to implement new rules—many 
of which still need to be enacted. Nonethe-
less, SIFIs still can safely rely upon taxpayers 
to bear some of the downside risk of their 
financial decisions while private stakehold-
ers continue to enjoy the potential upside. 
As Federal Reserve Governor Jeremy Stein 
recently argued, “[W]e are quite a way from 
having fully solved the policy problems asso-
ciated with SIFIs.” In particular, “the market 
still appears to attach some probability to 
the government bailing out the creditors of 
a SIFI; this can be seen in the ratings uplift 
granted to large banks based on the ratings 
agencies’ assessment of the probability of 
government support.” 5
One of the main problems with the 
Dodd-Frank Act is that it focuses on symp-
toms, like excessive risk taking, rather than 
on the root causes related to the underlying 
incentives. The real question, in examining 
the recent financial crisis, is why the private 
actors were not properly incented by their own 
self-interested pursuit of profit to eliminate the 
inefficiencies that led to their excessive risk tak-
ing. Without a solid framework for under-
standing the root causes of their behavior, 
regulation quickly becomes policy Whac-A-
Mole, a continuous losing battle that focuses 
on responding defensively to ever-changing 
symptoms. This reactionary approach to 
regulation cannot lay the real groundwork 
for mitigating future disasters and actually 
can cause economic harm by raising costs 
and reducing productive activity.
This brief summarizes “an economist 
way of thinking” about regulating SIFIs, 
founded on the concept of market failures. 
If there were no market failures, regulation 
would not be needed and likely would be 
misguided. But market failures do happen. 
Without an understanding of the core mar-
ket failures that actually exist, regulation will 
be missing or slapdash. A framework built 
on market failures provides a foundation 
for thinking critically and finding the right 
policy solutions.
We then use this framework to ana-
lyze the current regulatory environment. 
While Dodd-Frank does make a couple of 
important key changes consistent with our 
framework, the world remains vulnerable.
Finally, we show how a fairly simple and 
actionable regulatory model, where reverse 
convertible debt generates market signals to 
help realign incentives, can be implemented 
to address most of these market failures. This 
illustrative regulatory model transfers most 
of the risk efficiently back to the private par-
ties in proper order of their access to infor-
mation and their roles and responsibilities: 
executives, shareholders, bondholders, and 
then counterparties. The risk to taxpayers is 
substantially reduced. 
the maRKet FailuReS
For starters, we must be clear about what 
we mean by a “market failure.” Economists 
distinguish between reasonable risk-taking 
and risk-taking that is inefficient ex-ante. 
For example, did the CEO take a risk that 
her shareholders would have approved had 
they been fully informed? Or, did the CEO 
simply gamble because she profited dispro-
portionately from the upside in the form 
of stock options? The former is simply bad 
luck, the latter a market failure.
Our analysis has identified four key 
market failures facing the financial system.
I. Bounded Rationality (in particular, 
a form known as “disaster myopia”) occurs 
when low probability events or events with 
little history are ignored in the face of con-
siderable complexity costs. The possibility of 
a 9/11 terrorist attack, for example, became 
more obvious in hindsight. Ignoring low 
probability events is rational if the associated 
severity is low, since there are costs associ-
ated with planning for every possible event. 
It becomes a problem, however, when those 
events also have a large severity of loss: that’s 
the reason why people buy house insurance 
even though the chance of a significant loss 
is small. There is ample evidence that prior 
to the financial crisis, CEO’s, CIO’s, CFO’s 
and other key employees of investment 
firms, insurers and other financial intermedi-
aries took large risks they didn’t understand. 
Of course, today, those private actors better 
appreciate these risks. However, they can 
continue to ignore these risks if they face 
little cost of being wrong because the gov-
ernment has their backs. Indeed, bounded 
rationality typically amplifies another mar-
ket failure, adverse selection.
II. Adverse Selection (in this context) 
occurs when securities sellers have better 
information about the risk of their prod-
ucts than buyers do. During the financial 
crisis, many contracts were greatly mis-
priced relative to their default risk, and not 
just in hindsight. “Lemons” (higher risk 
securities) were being successfully sold as 
“cherries” (lower risk). The evidence suggests 
that adverse selection didn’t act alone but 
exploited the bounded rationality of key deci-
sion makers who misjudged the odds and 
severities. Think of bounded rationality as 
the needle and adverse selection as the toxic 
drug. 
III. A Samaritan’s Dilemma, an 
expression coined by Nobel laureate James 
Buchanan, is a type of moral hazard that 
occurs when a party takes advantage of the 
protection offered by (usually) the govern-
ment, because the government, like the 
Good Samaritan, can’t credibly commit to 
not bailing out after a loss. Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, although technically 
private entities, benefitted from the implicit 
Congressional protection provided to their 
bondholders. In exchange, Fannie and Fred-
die responded to federal pressure to increase 
homeownership by buying “Alternative 
A” mortgages and substantial amounts of 
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Federal Role in the Secondary Mortgage Market (June 
2, 2011), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/122xx/doc12213/06-02-gses_testimony.pdf, 
which also notes that “losses have increased somewhat 
since [the original $291B estimate] because of the con-
tinued deterioration of conditions in the housing market” 
(p. 3).
 5 Jeremy C. Stein, “Regulating Large Financial Institutions,” 
Presented at IMF Conference, Washington, DC, April 17, 
2013. 
securitized loans. To finance these opera-
tions, both entities were able to borrow at 
low rates and carry substantial amounts of 
leverage, often 40 - 70 times their equity, 
and much higher if you count the face 
value of the guarantees that they extended. 
The bailout of the bondholders of both 
institutions only enhanced the Samaritan’s 
Dilemma. The government also bailed out 
many financial institutions that were not 
previously viewed as having this implicit 
guarantee, only adding to the Dilemma.
IV. A Principal-Agent Problem 
exists when an agent who is employed by a 
principal does not act in the principal’s best 
interest. Executives don’t always maximize 
shareholder value if the executives’ actions 
are hard to monitor. Likewise, salespeople 
working on commission might increase sales 
regardless of costs. Large firms are espe-
cially difficult to risk manage. A single small 
unit in AIG collapsed the entire company; 
similar events occurred previously at Barings 
and other firms. Such diseconomies of scale 
are challenging for non-key personnel and 
shareholders to ascertain before actual losses 
emerge. In the meantime, a larger firm affords 
generous compensation to those who run it.
Figure 1 summarizes the role that each 
market failure played in the 2008 financial 
crisis. While each market failure remains 
important today, the Samaritan’s Dilemma 
is the most challenging; indeed, all major G20 
countries have all but given up on the pretense 
that they won’t bail out SIFIs after ruin. 
the DoDD-FRanK aCt 
leaveS ameRiCa anD the 
WoRlD expoSeD
The Dodd-Frank Act may appear to address 
some of the market failures illustrated above. 
However, by focusing on symptoms instead 
of root causes, Dodd-Frank leaves much 
work to be done.
BounDeD Rationality anD 
aDveRSe SeleCtion
Some of Dodd-Frank’s most successful 
policies come from enhancing informa-
tion and lowering the cost of obtaining it, 
thereby reducing bounded rationality and 
adverse selection.6 First, the Act attempts to 
formalize the derivatives trading process by 
encouraging that more trades be executed 
through clearinghouses and exchanges, where 
a third party provides more due diligence and 
engages in more risk management. In prac-
tice, though, loopholes and clever industry 
workarounds are emerging.7 Second, the Act 
also reduces the role of the credit rating agen-
cies by creating more competition and reduc-
ing the SEC’s and Federal Reserve’s reliance 
on ratings for determining capital buffers 
and collateral. There is little evidence that 
the standard Moody’s-S&P-Fitch oligopoly, 
though, is facing any serious competition. 
Moreover, coordination with Basel III’s reli-
ance on ratings remains unresolved. Third, the 
Act mandates using stress tests to evaluate 
risk across financial institutions. But, so far, 
those tests emphasize worst-case scenarios, 
and their methodology is not transparent to 
outside parties, reducing their effectiveness.
the SamaRitan’S Dilemma
Dodd-Frank is fairly weak when it comes to 
dealing with the Samaritan’s Dilemma. First, 
 6 See, for example, David A. Skeel, The New Financial Deal: 
Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and its (Unintended) 
Consequences (John Wiley & Sons, 2011).
 7 See, for example, “A $4 Trillion Dodd-Frank Loophole,” 
BusinessWeek, September 11, 2012.
 8 William C. Dudley, “Solving the Too Big to Fail Problem,” 
Remarks at the Clearing House’s Second Annual Busi-
ness Meeting and Conference, New York City, November 
15, 2012. 
 9 Richard Herring, “Wind-down Plans as an Alternative to 
Bailouts: The Cross Border Challenges,” in Kenneth Scott 
and John Taylor, eds., Ending Government Bailouts as 
we Know Them (Hoover Press, 2010), pp. 125-151.
 10 The Dodd-Frank Act: Title XI—Federal Reserve Sys-
tem Provisions, http://housedocs.house.gov/rules/
finserv/111_hr4173_finsrvcr.pdf.
 11 The Dodd-Frank Act: Title I—Financial Stability, http://
housedocs.house.gov/rules/finserv/111_hr4173_finsrvcr.
pdf.
 12 In Senate conference, the Volcker Rule was liberalized 
to allow banks to make outside investments in hedge 
funds, private equity and other instruments. Only 0.5% 
- 2.0% of bank revenue comes from proprietary trading, 
although Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, 
JPMorgan and Bank of America earn substantially more 
from such trades.  See Standard and Poors, “For U.S. 
Bank Ratings, the Volcker Rule’s Impact Depends on the 
Final Details,” October 12, 2002.
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 13 See William C. Dudley, “Some Lessons from the Crisis,” 
Remarks at the Institute of International Bankers Mem-
bership Luncheon, New York, October 13, 2009. 
 14 See Daniel K. Tarullo, “Regulating Systemically Important 
Financial Firms,” Remarks at the Peter G. Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, 
June 3, 2011. However, Tarullo later seems to be more 
receptive to contingent capital. See Daniel K. Tarullo, “In-
dustry Structure and Systemic Risk Regulation,” Remarks 
at the Brookings Institution Conference on Structuring 
the Financial Industry to Enhance Economic Growth and 
Stability, December 4, 2012, p. 13. New York Federal 
Reserve President William Dudley also argues that “the 
introduction of a contingent capital instrument seems 
likely to hold real promise.” See Dudley, “Some Lessons 
from the Crisis.” It appears, therefore, that the Federal 
Reserve has not yet arrived at a concrete position. Dodd-
Frank allows, but does not require, the Federal Reserve 
to issue a report on contingent capital by July 21, 2014, 
after the FSOC issues its findings to Congress. The 
FSOC issued its report and “recommends that contingent 
capital instruments remain an area for continued private 
sector innovation, and encourages the Federal Reserve 
and other financial regulators to continue to study the 
advantages and disadvantages of including contingent 
capital and bail-in instruments in their regulatory capital 
frameworks.” See Financial Stability Oversight Council, 
“Report to Congress on Study of a Contingent Capital 
the Act requires SIFIs to design and regu-
larly update their “living wills”—their own 
funeral instructions—in order to expedite 
their liquidation upon failure. In theory, an 
orderly liquidation process quickly unlocks 
remaining capital to reduce the cascading 
nature of defaults across financial institu-
tions. A living will also clearly identifies 
subordinated stakeholders who are most at 
risk, giving them more incentive to closely 
monitor the SIFI’s risks. Still, much of the 
Samaritan’s Dilemma problem remains: 
counterparties, bondholders and maybe even 
some equity owners can depend, in full or 
in part, on the government backdrop and 
therefore are less likely to engage in due 
diligence and risk management. More-
over, initial drafts of living wills were due 
last summer and fell short of the Federal 
Reserve’s and FDIC’s expectations.8 They 
are also hard to coordinate across interna-
tional legal standards.9
Second, the emergency lending powers 
of the Federal Reserve have been restricted 
to assisting a bank’s liquidity rather than 
supporting an insolvent institution.10 
Instead, a bailout requires the backing of the 
new Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC), representing a more diverse set 
of opinions of the nation’s largest federal 
regulators. In fact, many actions require 
supermajority support.11 In theory, there-
fore, a SIFI can’t count on being bailed out, 
thereby being allowed to fail like Lehman 
(although presumably not in the same 
manner). Such a random or “mixed strat-
egy” is indeed often optimal in the pres-
ence of moral hazard. In practice, however, 
a supermajority of FSOC members would 
likely support a bailout of an institution that 
has already been designated as a SIFI by 
the G20. Most of the voting members are 
presidential appointments anyway, and so 
they would likely pay attention to the wishes 
of the Administration.
Third, the so-called “Volcker Rule,” 
which garnered significant media attention, 
attempts to prohibit a bank from trading 
for its own account (“proprietary trading”), 
rather than trading on a client’s behalf. The 
thrust of the Rule is that “prop desks” don’t 
serve a regular business purpose and so 
taxpayers should not be exposed to seem-
ingly personal bets tucked underneath the 
too-big-to-fail implicit guarantee. How-
ever, a well-functioning bank dealer doesn’t 
simply pass through a client’s risk, like a 
pure broker, to an outside counterparty. It 
pools clients’ idiosyncratic risks, bringing 
to the market the remainder that it can sell 
at a price less than its internal risk cost. It’s 
nearly impossible to determine at the mar-
gin when that remainder constitutes trading 
for the bank’s own interests or a client’s. 
Even government regulators can’t apparently 
agree on how to detect a violation, delay-
ing the Rule’s actual implementation. Even 
though obvious violations could be detected, 
the Rule, including its watered down imple-
mentation in Senate conference, will mainly 
only impact a few large banks yet increase 
compliance costs for all.12
Fourth, the Act requires the study of 
additional firm capital to augment a firm’s 
ability to suffer a loss, including contingent 
capital (discussed more below) and GAAP-
based capital requirements, which follow 
quarterly accounting statements. But the Act 
stops short of requiring capital requirements 
to reflect the market’s valuation of on- and 
off-balance sheet assets and liabilities and 
contingencies. 
the pRinCipal-agent pRoBlem
Dodd-Frank also does very little to address 
principal-agent problems. First, to deal with 
the conflicts of interest that are inherent 
in contract sellers paying for their own 
credit ratings, the Act now makes credit 
rating agencies just as liable as any other 
“expert,” such as the firm’s auditor. More-
over, it requires that credit agencies include 
an attestation in any credit rating that they 
were not influenced “by any other busi-
ness activities” and also requires agencies to 
create informational barriers between their 
marketing departments and their expert rat-
ers. But the Act does not ban unrelated con-
sulting. Moreover, sellers still pay for their 
own ratings, which is an almost unavoidable 
conflict of interest in the modern era where 
information on ratings can be easily shared.
Second, to deal with principal-agent 
problems between firm employees and 
shareholders, the Act enhances the execu-
tive “clawback” provisions already found in 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, requiring 
that firms seek repayment from any current 
or former executive of any incentive-based 
compensation paid during the three-year 
period preceding a “material noncompli-
ance.” However, executives are still incented 
to take big bets that can earn them nice 
bonuses, provided that such actions are 
revealed in accounting statements, which are 
often challenging for the market to under-
stand. In fact, executives would only have to 
return their bonuses if their bets fail, rather 
than suffer a large loss like their sharehold-
ers—and, even then, only if “material noncom-
pliance” can be proven, potentially litigated.
aligning inCentiveS With 
ReveRSe ConveRtiBle DeBt
The most effective regulatory policy aligns 
the incentives of each stakeholder accord-
ing to his or her access to information and 
responsibilities. Most current regulatory 
discussions thus far have focused on build-
ing a SIFI’s capital base as a buffer against 
losses and contagion. Of the different types 
of capital, contingent capital is likely to be the 
most effective at aligning incentives because 
its price can be highly responsive to the 
specific actions taken by a SIFI. But it must 
be implemented correctly to be effective.
Contingent Capital
Contingent capital is debt that can con-
vert to equity when a firm is in trouble. 
Requirement for Certain Nonbank Financial Companies 
and Bank Holding Companies,” July 2012, p. 3. 
 15 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Bank of 
England, “Resolving Globally Active, Systemically Impor-
tant, Financial Institutions: A Joint Paper,” December 10, 
2012. 
 16 Similarly, as Darrell Duffie writes: “The trigger that con-
verts the debt to equity should be set as to eliminate the 
debt claims before a liquidity crisis is likely to begin, and 
hopefully with a sufficiently strong impact on the balance 
sheet to forestall a self-fulfilling presumption of a liquidity 
crisis.” See Darrell Duffie, How Big Banks Fail: And What 
to Do about It (Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 50.
 17 A literature has examined optimal conversion triggers. 
See the extensive and excellent review in Charles Calo-
miris and Richard Herring, “Why and How to Design a 
Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement,” Brookings-
Wharton Papers on Financial Services, 2012. The Squam 
Lake Working Group on Federal Regulation, “An Expe-
dited Resolution Mechanism for Distressed Financial 
Firms: Regulatory Hybrid Securities,” Council on Foreign 
Relations Press, April 2009, recommends a dual trigger: 
an aggregate trigger based on the regulator declaring a 
systemic emergency and a firm-specific one based on a 
firm’s GAAP-based equity. Robert McDonald, “Contin-
gent Capital with a Dual Price Trigger,” Working Paper 
(Northwestern University, 2010) also considers a dual 
trigger while Mark Flannery, “Stabilizing Large Financial 
One particular type is a reverse convertible 
(debenture). The more familiar standard 
convertible gives the debt holder the option 
to convert into a predetermined number of 
company shares, an action normally taken as 
the share price increases. A reverse convert-
ible, by contrast, gives the company the right 
to force this conversion, an action usually 
taken as the share price declines. A reverse 
convertible, therefore, effectively reduces the 
debt load during challenging financial times. 
While used by some European banks in the 
past, reverse convertibles are uncommon in the 
U.S., where the tax treatement is less clear.
The policy goal of contingent capital 
is to protect taxpayers by allowing SIFIs to 
recapitalize during times of economic dis-
tress, known as a “bail in.” Contingent capi-
tal also gives the broad base of shareholders 
strong incentives to push for corrective actions 
before the trigger point to avoid dilution.13
Among its 2319 pages, the Dodd-Frank 
Act requires that regulators study “contin-
gent capital” in more detail, but it doesn’t 
go much further. Federal Reserve Governor 
Daniel K. Tarullo, who serves as the Fed’s 
point person for non-consumer financial 
regulation, recently stated that “for all the 
attention paid to [contingent capital] in the 
last few years, it is even now not clear as a 
practical matter that an instrument can be 
developed which would be cheaper than 
common equity but still structured so as to 
convert in a timely, reliable fashion.”14 Under 
Dodd-Frank, the Federal Reserve has until 
July 22, 2014, to suggest a firm position. 
Until then, U.S. law remains fairly silent on 
contingent capital.
The G20’s Financial Stability Board, 
though, is studying contingent capital in 
more detail. One idea being discussed is that 
a top holding company of the SIFI would 
amass a large amount of long-term unse-
cured debt. A “single entry” regulator in each 
country would have the power to force the 
conversion to equity as part of liquidation, 
thereby providing some buffer to taxpayers. 
In the U.S., this role would likely fall to the 
FDIC under the orderly liquidation powers 
granted to it by Dodd-Frank.15 As currently 
being discussed, though, this contingent 
capital does not address Governor Tarullo’s 
concern about conversion occurring in a 
“timely, reliable fashion.”16 Instead, its 
objective is to mainly protect taxpayers from 
losses from a “gone concern” rather than to 
support a “going concern.” Furthermore, its 
price also would not serve as a quality early 
warning signal to policymakers or be the 
basis for pegging various pre-failure incentives.
ChaRaCteRiStiCS oF optimal 
Contingent Capital
The optimal implementation of contingent 
capital would: (I) allow market prices to 
help predict a failure early enough to help 
avoid a liquidity crisis, (II) produce a pure 
signal that is not distorted by endogenous 
government actions themselves (including 
the bail-in itself ), (III) be specific to a SIFI’s 
own actions and (IV) promote consistency 
across borders. Let’s briefly consider each 
criterion in turn.
(I) Without harnessing the power of 
market prices, the various regulatory bodies 
would have to be well informed, coordinated 
and proactive. The competitive market, 
in contrast, is typically faster and more 
accurate. Regulators, for example, entered 
Bear Sterns only days before it would have 
defaulted; in contrast, its share price actually 
fell long before. The credit rating agencies don’t 
do much better. Their ratings, for example, 
often substantially lag credit default spreads 
for sovereign debt, which explains why credit 
downgrades often have little impact. 
(II) Any pure signal also should not be 
contaminated by the regulators’ decisions or 
the bail-in action. A SIFI’s standard bond 
yield, or credit default swap risk premium 
trading on those bonds, therefore is not 
a good pick for the trigger that decides 
when to convert the contingent capital into 
equity.17 At a minimum, those prices are 
noisy, since they would capitalize expected 
government action.18 When government 
action is highly likely, focusing on those 
instruments could even lead to an indeter-
minacy of government action. The firm’s 
share price, while a potential contender, is 
also at least somewhat distorted by govern-
ment action and the potential of the bail-in 
itself.19 Instead, the price signal should track 
an instrument that is also subordinate to gov-
ernment help and even the contingent capital.
(III) Ultimately, getting an early and 
pure signal should be part of a structure that 
incentivizes each SIFI to be prudent. This 
is an area where Basel III, while improving 
the quality of capital, falls short. Most of the 
required capital in Basel is a constant frac-
tion of equity or tied to a measure of risk-
weighted assets. But a significant amount of 
variation can occur within each risk bucket, 
thereby allowing for substantial amounts 
of moral hazard in the presence of the 
government guarantee.20 Additional forms 
of capital, including countercyclical capital 
and a “SIFI surcharge” are discussed below; 
while they can likely play a role in reform, 
they also fail to align marginal incentives.
(IV) Having a consistent cross-border 
standard is also important in order to not 
create competitive advantages for SIFIs who 
“game” the market failures. As it currently 
stands, the existing and simpler Basel regula-
tions have not been consistently applied 
across countries. In Congressional testimony, 
Governor Tarullo argued, “Despite extensive 
sharing of information on supervisory prac-
tices, the Basel Committee has, over the years, 
found it difficult to achieve . . . rigorous and 
“A reactionary approach to 
regulation cannot lay the real 
groundwork for mitigating 
future disasters.”
Institutions with Contingent Capital Certificates,” Working 
Paper (University of Florida, 2009) argues for the benefit 
a single trigger based on firm’s equity. Duffie, How Big 
Banks Fail, reviews various triggers, although he does 
not settle on one. The literature has also discussed the 
potential of market manipulation (e.g., “bear runs”) to 
manipulate various triggers. But the literature has not 
examined a trigger in the presence of a likely government 
backstop.
 18 See Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory 
(MIT Press, 2000), pp. 17-18. In the setting herein, the 
government’s actions should be contingent on a negative 
signal, but the market would not produce this signal if it 
is confident that the government will help.
 19 The distortion to the share price by the anticipated bail-in 
will be greatest at a low share price. Suresh Sundar-
esan and Zhenyu Wang also argue that, even without 
additional government action, the conversion of the 
contingent capital itself could lead to a downward spiral 
in share price: if the market believes that the SIFI is in 
trouble, the share price will fall by even more than without 
the contingent capital because its conversion will dilute 
shareholders even more.  See the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, “Design of Contingent Capital with Stock 
Price Trigger for Conversion,” Staff Report 448, 2010. 
Charles Calomiris and Richard Herring, in “Why and How 
to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement,” 
argue that their approach to an equity-based trigger is 
consistent application of those rules by super-
visors and firms across countries.”21Achieving 
consistent application will become only 
harder, even with peer review, as regula-
tors’ rules move toward even more complex 
bank-specific capital standards. In contrast, 
markets are highly incented to make such 
judgments.
illuStRative uSe oF ReveRSe 
ConveRtiBle DeBt aS integRateD 
paRt oF RegulatoRy ReFoRm
One such regulatory structure using contin-
gent capital is illustrated in Figure 2. During 
normal economic times, SIFIs would sell 
unsecured contingent capital to the open 
market that is subordinate to the firm’s bond 
holders and most other claims. To be con-
crete, we’ll think of these contracts as reverse 
convertibles, although the exact nomencla-
ture is unimportant. 
SIFIs would be required to sell these 
contracts in addition to the other potential 
capital requirements of Basel III, including 
risk-weighted capital, a countercyclical buf-
fer, and a capital “SIFI surcharge.” The exact 
amount of reverse convertibles required 
to be sold would, at a minimum, be set to 
equalize the average cost of capital between 
the SIFI and non-SIFIs during normal 
times, as SIFIs will likely continue to enjoy 
a lower cost of capital in the presence of the 
Samaritan’s Dilemma, even post-Basel III. 
Of course, since the larger interest paid on 
the reverse convertible is in exchange for the 
firm’s option to recapitalize, the equalization 
of the cost of capital is a lower bound. In 
practice, a large share of the firm debt would 
be required to be held in the form of reverse 
convertibles to reduce any SIFI advantage. 
SIFIs then would be required to run a 
battery of standardized stress tests. These 
testing suites would be updated regularly 
by the appropriate regulator in the United 
States, likely the Federal Reserve and SEC 
working together. Internally, SIFIs could 
automate many of these tests, much like 
how eBay or Facebook routinely runs a large 
suite of automated “unit,” “regression,” and 
“penetration” tests on its code base. 
Unlike the current bank stress tests 
conducted in the United States, however, we 
envision that stress tests would be standard-
ized, extensive, and public. Arguments made 
by SIFIs for keeping stress test results secret 
seem to have more to do with protecting 
executives and rent seeking than safeguard-
ing intellectual secrets. Indeed, stress tests 
in Europe have become more extensive 
over time. But if U.S. regulators were truly 
concerned about these issues or the costs 
associated with stress tests, the tests could 
be broken up into multiple and conditional 
testing suites, including “Level 1” (L1) tests 
during normal times and more detailed 
“Level 2” (L2) tests performed only after 
negative market signals, as shown in  
Figure 2.
Getting the right market signal is criti-
cal for measuring a SIFI’s risk of default. As 
noted earlier, a reverse convertible note must 
offer a higher yield than the bank’s senior 
FiguRe 2: illuStRative uSe oF ReveRSe ConveRtiBle DeBt aS eaRly WaRning SignalS
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less susceptible to this problem if firms have enough time 
to issue capital. 
20  Patrick Slovik shows that over the past two decades, 
SIFI’s were able to drop their risk-weighted assets from 
almost 70% to about 35% and even “transform high-risk 
subprime loans into seemingly low-risk securities on a 
scale that would spark a global financial crisis.” See 
“Systemically Important Banks and Capital Regulation 
Challenges,” OECD Working Paper No. 916, 2012, p. 
10. See also Robert Pozen, Too Big to Save? How to Fix 
the U.S. Financial System (John Wiley & Sons, 2010).
21  Daniel K. Tarullo, Statement before the Committee on 
Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
June 16, 2011. 
22  Contingent capital and mandatory equity offerings are es-
sentially the only two methods of recapitalization possible 
at this point and the ones most commonly discussed 
by regulators. Several commentators believe that a 
mandatory equity offering is challenging for regulators to 
enforce after a shock, while others (including Duffie, How 
Big Banks Fail) argue that they have worked in Europe. 
Nonetheless, most attention has focused on contingent 
capital.
23  1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583.
24  Darrell Duffie and David A. Skeel, Jr., “A Dialogue on the 
Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and 
Repurchase Agreements,” Stanford University Working 
Paper No. 108, 2012.
standard debt because the note will be con-
verted to equity when the SIFI is perform-
ing poorly. The difference between these 
two yields is a relative risk premium that 
indicates the value for this added risk on top 
of the firm’s normal risk. This risk premium, 
however, is not pure enough of a signal for 
the conversion trigger, since a severe default 
could impact the yield paid by the senior 
debt as well, unless it were fully protected by 
government action. 
Instead, a “conversion swap” market 
that tracks the conversion of these reverse 
convertibles into equity would need to arise. 
After a conversion of the contingent debt 
to equity, the seller of the conversion swap 
would take delivery of the underlying equity 
in exchange for making the originally-
promised bond payments. Unlike credit 
default swaps trading on senior debt, the 
volume in this new conversion swap market 
should be robust for two reasons. First, even 
equity investors would be attracted to the 
potential of buying equity “on the cheap” if 
the risk premium of a conversion swap rose 
to an inefficient large level. To ensure that 
the market has sufficient time to respond to 
even a potential “bear run” that artificially 
inflates the risk premium, we assume that 
the conversion of the contingent debt to 
equity only happens after the risk premium 
exceeds a certain level (6% in our example) 
for a given time threshold (30 days). Second, 
the ability to insure the reverse convertibles 
with swaps should let large institutional 
investors such as insurance companies hold 
the reverse convertibles as reserves. The 
combination of reverse convertibles and the 
swaps trading on them then should support 
a large demand for each.
The spread on these conversion swaps 
therefore would be based on the fundamen-
tal outlook of the bank’s solvency and serve 
as a pure early warning signal to regulators. 
If the risk spread exceeded some threshold 
(shown as 6% in Figure 2, for the sake of 
concreteness) some minimal actions to pre-
serve capital, falling on executives, are taken 
along with additional stress tests and vol-
untary actions by the firm to restore capital 
to regulated minimums. If the spread stays 
above the threshold for a period of time 
(say 30 days) then additional actions are 
taken that dilute shareholders are mandatory, 
including conversion of contingent capital 
into equity. If still required, additional equity 
offerings are made.22
Post-conversion, the role of regulators 
is necessarily discretionary. The Federal 
Reserve may make some limited investment, 
in exchange for preferred shares, if they 
believe that default of non-contingent debt 
could result in liquidity problems; if those 
shares are not paid off within a reasonable 
period then the Federal Reserve would 
sell them in the open market and buyers 
naturally would retain the option to convert 
to common. However, the size of the Federal 
Reserve’s actions is limited and bondholders 
face risk. Key employees (including previ-
ous ones) suffer additional losses, includ-
ing repayment of some past compensation. 
Experimental work has demonstrated that 
people are often more highly incented to 
the loss of previous income rather than the 
potential of earning additional income. If 
large contagion effects are suspected, addi-
tional government action for counterpar-
ties can be taken by the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council. In most cases, coun-
terparties would receive a haircut on their 
investments.
Contingent Capital iS moRe 
eFFeCtive at aligning inCentiveS 
than otheR FoRmS oF Capital 
Besides the Basel III core capital require-
ments noted earlier, Basel III and U.S. 
regulators also are contemplating other 
forms of capital, including “countercycli-
cal capital” and a capital “SIFI surcharge.” 
The SIFI surcharge, in particular, attempts 
to peg capital requirements to a SIFI’s own 
complexity and potential contagion impact 
upon failure. It is also apparently the form of 
additional capital being most closely studied 
by the Federal Reserve. But, while such a 
surcharge can certainly be part of a compre-
hensive regulatory reform, it still does not 
tie at the margin to the actual actions taken 
by the firm: after the surcharge is paid, the 
firm can still engage in moral hazard, and 
it is doubtful that the Fed would, or even 
could, increase the surcharge once it finally 
realizes that the SIFI is in trouble. Even the 
FDIC has struggled to implement its exist-
ing risk-based assessment. Taxpayers could 
find themselves quickly on the hook for 
losses without a “bail in” buffer. To compen-
sate, the Fed would be tempted to simply 
overestimate the surcharge ex ante, which is 
also inefficient. Indeed, Governor Tarullo 
created a stir when he suggested that some 
capital surcharges could lead to a doubling 
of Basel III requirements—a statement from 
which the Federal Reserve appeared to back 
away subsequently. 
At a minimum, any SIFI surcharge 
should at least be guided by signals of risk 
from contingent capital rather than relying 
on a regulator’s internal model. Simply 
put, it is unlikely that regulators could ever 
develop models for assessing firm-level 
SIFI surcharges that are more accurate than 
market prices.
upDating the “automatiC 
Stay” Rule exemption
Our illustrative regulatory framework 
encourages SIFI counterparties to conduct 
due diligence, since government action 
might not fully cover their losses upon 
bankruptcy. In practice, though, counterpar-
ties holding “qualified financial contracts” 
(derivatives) are exempt from the “automatic 
stay” rule in bankruptcy, allowing them to 
close out their positions and seize underly-
ing collateral outside (and before) the nor-
mal liquidation process. Congress in 1982 
believed this exemption from the automatic 
stay was necessary to prevent the “insolvency 
of one commodity or security from spread-
ing to other firms and possibly threatening 
the collapse of the affected market.”23 Of 
course, as we saw during the recent financial 
crisis, the first-come-first-served approach 
to recovering collateral can lead to an 
intense run on the bank, especially for trades 
not cleared through a clearinghouse or an 
exchange. Moreover, the derivative exemp-
tion allows for a potentially large “loophole” 
where non-derivative contracts are repack-
aged as derivatives for circumventing the 
automatic stay. Dodd-Frank did little to 
change these rules other than allowing for a 
one-day moratorium and banning “walkaway” 
clauses, where nondefaulting parties can “walk 
away” from their own payment obligations.
Recent thoughtful and detailed analysis 
has argued for modifications to the auto-
matic stay rule for various types of transac-
tions, especially for SIFIs and transactions 
not cleared through a third party.24 These 
changes are likely an integral part of any 
serious regulatory reform that aims to 
encourage counterparties to conduct a 
greater amount of their own due diligence. 
ConCluSionS
The too-big-to-fail problem remains too 
big of a problem. Government regulations 
to date have fallen short. But a more solid 
regulatory framework can be built. Regula-
tions should not simply aim to tame the 
market by focusing on one apparent symp-
tom and then the next. Rather, the power of 
the market itself must be used to discipline 
itself. Contingent capital is one effective way 
to harness market signals and encourage 
restraint, in conjunction with other reforms. 
Its use is currently being debated by the G20. 
Successful implementation, however, requires 
keen attention to details, including layering it 
correctly within the SIFI’s capital structure.
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brief in brief
·  The Dodd-Frank Act does not provide 
sufficient protection against another major 
financial crisis.
·  A better regulatory system would promote 
financial stability by correcting the key 
market failures that lead to excessive risk 
taking by Strategically Important Financial 
Institutions (SIFIs).
·  Regulatory policies centered on contingent 
capital would offer a clearer and purer 
market signal when a SIFI is performing poorly 
and trigger steps to mitigate the financial risks.
